August 17, 2008
By CHARLES BIERBAUER
Guest Columnist – The State
With one exception, Russians have never much liked Georgians. Perhaps they didn’t like Joseph Stalin, either, but they certainly feared him and, in a perverse way, admired how the Soviet leader flexed Russian muscle. Stalin, born Iosef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili at the end of the 19th century, grew up in Gori, the Georgian town we’ve been seeing crumbling under Russian shelling.
Gori, when I visited in the late 1970s, was one of the few places in the Soviet Union that still boasted a statue of Stalin. Nikita Khrushchev, a successor as head of the Soviet Communist Party, had condemned Stalin’s rule by brutality. Elsewhere, Stalin’s likeness disappeared. Mostly. I have not seen Stalin’s statue in video from embattled Gori. Perhaps you have. Online photos show it was still there last year.
Instead, the rubble in Gori and other Georgian towns is the monument to Stalin’s contemporary Kremlin inheritors. They still know how to flex Russian muscle.
Vladimir Putin, today’s strongman operating under the title of prime minister, claims the Russian offensive was provoked by Georgia. Putin has an arguable point.
Georgia and Russia have been in heated and sporadically violent dispute over South Ossetia, the breakaway province of Georgia that has sought to reunite with Russia. In the most recent eruption, Georgian troops had improvidently struck first in their attempt to regain control of South Ossetia.
On the other hand, when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Georgia became a sovereign state. The Georgians have an arguable point that the Russian troops are invaders.
History and geography in this part of the world are complicated. The Cold War was relatively simple. East vs. West. The Soviet Union vs. the United States. Black hats vs. white hats, if you will, from an American perspective.
The post-Cold War world is blurred, murky and treacherous. In 1991, George H. W. Bush, emboldened by the collapse of communism in Europe and a Persian Gulf War victory, declared a “new world order.” On September 11, 2001, a new world disorder erupted.
Putinism — a revival of Russian expansionist dreams as old as Ivan the Terrible — has spread roots in the fallow field left untended as the United States struggled with its own devils in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia’s resurgence might have come about without a 9/11. But Washington’s distraction and the windfall riches of Russia’s oil and gas reserves have fueled Putin’s ambitions to reel back in as much of the old Soviet Union as he could.
Among the former Soviet republics, Georgia is an unusual case. It has grown particularly close to the United States. The young president Mikheil Saakashvili studied law at Columbia and Georgetown. The United States has backed the construction of pipelines across Georgia from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, purposefully bypassing Russia. Georgia has been encouraged to seek membership in NATO. The western alliance was created to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War and has now crept closer to Moscow with its inclusion of former Soviet satellites in East Europe.
Russian paranoia never lies deep below the surface. And underlying the current Georgian strife is the ethnic divide that rattled even the enormous Soviet Union. Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians are ethnic Slavs, but mistake a Ukrainian for a Russian at your own risk. Georgians, Armenians and Azeris are not. Nor are Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs and more.
All of the former Soviet republics have substantial Russian minorities, an opportunity or excuse for Russia to claim it is defending the rights of fellow Russians.
But not all Russians see it that way. At a conference in Chicago last week, I chatted with a young doctoral student now at the University of Alabama, but originally from Tashkent in Uzbekistan. She described herself as Russian ethnically, but Uzbek nationally. She’s not interested in being a Russian (or Soviet) citizen.
Stalin had a simple way of dealing with ethnic matters. He simply ordered the expulsion of whole populations — Koreans, Turks, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens and more — to outposts of the empire. Where those minorities moved out, Russians moved in.
Stalin died in 1953, but in South Ossetia, Stalin’s legacy is still kicking up trouble.
Mr. Bierbauer was ABC News bureau chief in Moscow, 1978-80. He is dean of the College of Mass Communications and Information Studies at the University of South Carolina.
January 4, 2008
by Charles Bierbauer
You don’t have to win the Iowa Caucuses, as presidential candidates Barack Obama and Mike Huckabee have just done. You just have to beat expectations.
Hillary Clinton, John Edwards and Mitt Romney came up short. On to New Hampshire for a second, perhaps final, chance for trailing candidates. Time is short. They have five days to change their fortunes.
An Iowa loss is not fatal, no more so than losing the first game of a football season. Ohio State and LSU both made it to this year’s NCAA championship with blemished records. In the past 32 years, only Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush won contested Iowa caucuses and then the presidency.
But losing in Iowa is painful when, like Clinton, you are expected and expecting to win. Or like Edwards, you have pretty much invested your energies and resources on the first roll of the dice, hoping that Iowa will push you to the head of the pack and replenish your bankroll. Or like Romney, you have outspent your opponents by a factor of 20 or 30 to one, but been outscored by a challenger (Huckabee) who was an asterisk in the polls only a couple months ago.
Obama has shattered the expectation that an African-American candidate cannot win in a state where even the Democratic voters are 93% white. Obama neither mentions that, nor campaigns as an African-American. But TVs talking heads note his Iowa victory changes the expectations about a black candidate winning the white vote.
Donna Brazile, an African-American strategist who was Al Gore’s campaign manager, says Obama has “momentum for New Hampshire and beyond,” meaning South Carolina and its large proportion of African-American Democrats. CNN analyst Bill Schneider speculated that black voters may not want to block the first legitimate chance for a black candidate to gain his party’s nomination.
Hillary Clinton had expected to share the African-American vote with Obama, in part because she appeals to older women, in part because Bill Clinton is still the favorite politician of many blacks. Hillary’s organization and funds are deep enough to withstand a second loss and make an uphill climb. But no more third place finishes if she’s to do it.
Edwards may barely make it to South Carolina, so top heavy was his investment in Iowa that even a second place falls short of Edwards’ early expectations. And he cannot realistically expect to win the state he was born in with Obama and Clinton in the race.
Huckabee, needless to say, has dramatically exceeded expectations. He has captured the vote of the so-called religious conservatives who had been searching the political wilderness for their candidate. He has captivated the media who have crowned him “frontrunner.” In an irony, Huckabee does not now need to win in New Hampshire. Indeed, he is not expected to.
Romney, on the other hand, really needs to win New Hampshire before the primary campaign swings to the South where Romney is not expected to do as well.
John McCain, largely ignoring Iowa except for a late flurry that put him in a virtual tie for third with Fred Thompson, could improve his overall chances by further weakening a wobbly Romney in New Hampshire. A rejuvenated McCain and a plucky Huckabee would then be expected to fight for the next surge here in South Carolina. (Frankly, I don’t know what to expect of Thompson, but I’m not alone.)
Rudy Giuliani wound up sixth among Republicans in Iowa, leading analyst David Gergen to opine on CNN that “Giuliani’s strategy worked.” You can’t lose Iowa if you don’t play. Giuliani was in Florida, noting he’d “paid attention to the states others haven’t paid attention to.” He’s gambling on getting past Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina, but it’s one way to beat the expectations game.
Note to candidates: If your name is not mentioned here, you’ve exhausted your expectations and may already be a former candidate.
Charles Bierbauer followed the campaign trail from Iowa to New Hampshire and beyond as a CNN correspondent in elections from 1984 through 2000. He is dean of the College of Mass Communications and Information Studies at the University of South Carolina, though the views here are his own and not those of the university. Bierbauer is senior contributing editor and a consultant to SCHotline.com.